A Vote Cast; A Vote Counted: Quantifying Voting Rights through Proportional Representation in Congressional Elections by McCann, Michael
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship University of New Hampshire – School of Law
1-1-2002
A Vote Cast; A Vote Counted: Quantifying Voting
Rights through Proportional Representation in
Congressional Elections
Michael McCann
University of New Hampshire School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Election Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Political Science Commons,
and the Politics and Social Change Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael McCann, "A Vote Cast; A Vote Counted: Quantifying Voting Rights through Proportional Representation in Congressional
Elections," 12 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 191 (2002).
A Vote Cast; A Vote Counted: Quantifying Voting Rights




I. Introduction: Reassessing "Winner-Take-All" Voting Systems ........... 191
II. An Alternative: Proportional Representation .......................... 193
III. The Benefits of Proportional Representation: Expanding the Democratic
Experience for More Americans .................................... 194
IV. The Drawbacks of Proportional Representation: Tailoring a New Voting
System to Address Legitimate Concerns ............................. 204
V. The Legal Viability of Proportional Representation in Congressional
Elections ...................................................... 208
V I. Conclusion .................................................... 212
I. INTRODUCTION: Michael A. McCann received his J.D. from
REASSESSING the University of Virginia School of Law in
"WINNER-TAKE-ALL" 2002. He received a B.A., magna cum laude,
VOTING SYSTEMS at Georgetown University in 1998. The
author is an attorney at Testa, Hurwitz &
The current "winner-take- Thibeault, LLP, in Boston, Massachusetts
all" or "first-past-the-post" system and may be reached by email at
of voting places enormous michaelanthonymccann@hotmail.com. The
obstacles on minority ascension to author would like to thank Professors Kim
congressional office. In this Forde-Mazrui and Daryl Levinson of the
system, representatives are selected University of Virginia School of Law for
from a single district in which the their assistance in this project.
candidate with the plurality of
McCann
votes gains victory. History has shown, however, that candidates who purport to
represent "minority" interests can rarely, if ever, expect to receive the most votes in
any congressional race. Some thought that the so-called "minority-majority" districts
of the early 1990s were a solution, particularly since more minority congresspersons
were elected because of such redistricting. The net political result of minority-majority
districts, however, was the election of more candidates unsympathetic to minority
views, as many minority votes were packed into minority-majority districts.
Moreover, such redistricting measures are now considered illegal, as the Supreme
Court has essentially invalidated the use of race in redistricting.
Additionally, because white voters constitute at least a plurality of voters in
every state except Hawaii, minorities in the forty-nine other states have had historically
little success in gaining election to the United States Senate.' As a consequence, the
only real opportunity for minorities to gain access to federal elected office remains
limited to the United States House of Representatives, thus highlighting the notion that
opportunities for minority congressional candidates should be expanded, not
contracted.
Some commentators believe that the flaws of the winner-take-all-system and
single member district are readily apparent. First, critics note that significant blocs of
voters - including minority voters - are consistently denied the right to elect a truly
preferred candidate, because such candidates can almost never expect to receive the
most votes. Consequently, many potential candidates are deterred from running
because the prospect for victory is so slim. As a result, large numbers of voters are
often forced not to select their preferred candidates, but instead to select the candidate
they believe has the greatest chance of winning.
In addition, many voters in a winner-take-all system are represented by persons
they did not support. In 1994, while Democratic candidates for Iowa's five seats in the
United States House of Representatives received 42% of the total votes cast in Iowa,
none of Iowa's five congressional seats was won by a Democrat. 2 Similarly, in 1992,
Republican congressional candidates garnered 48% of the two-party statewide vote in
North Carolina, but won only four of twelve seats.3 As stated by Stephen K. Medvic,
Director of the non-partisan Center for Voting and Democracy, a sizable number of
these voters are represented by someone they do not support.4 In this respect, many
losing votes are simply "wasted."
Alternatively, critics of the "winner-take-all" system, such as Mary A. Inman,
point out that wasted votes should also include those cast for the victorious candidate:
"The United States's congressional electoral system ... [is] aptly labeled 'extreme
majority rule' because the votes of members of any group constituting a majority in a
given district are essentially wasted."5 Consequently, any vote cast in addition to the
number needed for victory might as well have never been cast at all. In landslide
races, where the prospect of "wasting" one's vote is high, the incentive to vote,
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therefore, seems almost non-existent.6  Moreover, most congressional races are
landslide races. A study by the Center for Voting and Democracy found that 317 of the
435 House races in November 2000 were "essentially already decided.",7 That is, most
voters are not even offered two competitive candidates in a congressional race.
Consequently, many voters simply do not vote because they are consistently
denied the right to elect a candidate of their choosing, or, as Inman asserts, some voters
may rightly feel that their votes are "wasted." Therefore, "winner-take-all systems"
discourage voter participation. 8 To illustrate this point, among the voting participation
rates of the twenty-one democracies in Western Europe and North America, the United
States ranks 20 , with only 36% of eligible voters casting ballots in the 1994
Congressional elections, and only 44% voting in 1996 - even when offered the
opportunity to select the president as well.9
II. AN ALTERNATIVE: PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
Some opponents of the "majority-take-all" voting system believe there is a
superior system: proportional representation. As will be discussed below in greater
detail, a party or candidate need not finish first to be elected in a system of proportional
representation. Instead, political parties or candidates receive the percent of legislative
seats that actually reflect the vote tally. As a result, proportional representation
systems may prove the fairest, most efficient method to ensuring that all voting
interests are accurately reflected in the legislative process.
There are two basic forms of proportional voting: "List Systems" and "Choice
Voting/Single Transferable Vote."
In the list system, the most widely-used form, a voter simply selects one party
and its slate of candidates. Thereafter, the seats are allocated on the basis of the share
of votes each party earned. For instance, in the Iowa congressional example discussed
above, instead of receiving zero congressional seats with 42% of the statewide vote,
the state Democratic Party would have earned two seats out of the available five.'
0
Often, with the list system, a minimum share of votes is required for a party to earn any
representation; typically a 3% to 5% threshold is used. Proponents of this system
argue that it is ideal for large legislatures on state and national levels.
Alternatively, in a "choice voting" or "single transferable" vote system, a voter
merely ranks candidates in order of preference (first choice, second choice, etc.).
Unlike with the list system, voters in choice voting elections usually select individual
candidates as opposed to parties. In practice, once a voter's first choice is elected or
eliminated, the voter's "excess votes" are transferred to subsequent preferred
candidates until all the seats are filled." Advocates of this form of proportional
representation note that with the single transferable vote, very few votes are "wasted,"
for voters can be certain that should their first choice not garner enough votes for
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victory, those votes will "transfer" to their secondary choices. For instance, a voter
most interested in reducing the size of government could select, as his first choice, a
Libertarian candidate, and as his second choice, a Republican. In this instance, the
voter can have confidence that, in the event his most preferred candidate loses, his
second choice will receive the vote.
If employed in congressional elections, proportional representation could be
applied in different ways, depending likely on the number of seats available in a state
and the cultural and geographic ties within a state. For instance, a state with few
congressional seats - such as Iowa with its five seats - could simply use statewide
elections to determine its representation. Alternatively, a more populous state such as
North Carolina (with eleven seats) could be divided in ways that preserve certain
historical and geographical ties. For instance, voting rights advocate Lee Mortimer
proposes that North Carolina be divided into three geographic regions, each then
having larger multi-member districts ranging from three to five seats. 12 Importantly,
no counties within North Carolina would have to be divided under this proposed
alignment.
III. THE BENEFITS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:
EXPANDING THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE FOR MORE
AMERICANS
From a public policy perspective, proportional representation offers several
enhancements over the winner-take-all-system, particularly in relation to improving the
political voice of minority groups. Under a winner-take-all system, minority groups
are often precluded from forming alliances with similarly situated groups, especially
when districts are drawn in a way that isolates one group. African Americans, for
example, may share some of the same beliefs as another isolated group. As Professor
Lani Guinier notes, "where blacks and whites are geographically separate, race-
conscious districting by definition isolates blacks from potential white allies, such as
white women, who are not geographically concentrated."
In contrast, coalition-building would more likely occur under a system of
proportional representation, and would advance opportunities for minority groups to
win congressional seats. For example, if we were to follow the aforementioned multi-
district plan for North Carolina, because African-Americans constitute a quarter of the
state's population and are reasonably well dispersed within the state, they could expect
to win in each of the three districts. More importantly, as noted by Mortimer,
coalition-building would likely enhance the opportunity for more seats: "Since
African-American candidates in a multi-member election would undoubtedly attract
some white voters, proportional representation holds out the possibility of additional
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minority winners. Any group of voters - racial, geographic, political, rural - can
carve out a constituency based on shared interest."'
14
Importantly, coalition-building can and does happen, even within single
member districts in a "winner-take-all" system. A good illustration of alliance building
is North Carolina's 12th Congressional District, where Mel Watt has served as a
congressman since 1992. Indeed, since his first election following a redistricted racial
gerrymander, Watt has consistently attracted over 70% of the district's vote, in a
district where 41% of the voters are white and 56% are black. 's According to
Congressman Watt, those who live in urban communities "share a common set of
concerns: unemployment and poverty, drugs and gun violence, inadequate childcare
and public transit, and a paucity of federal dollars to deal with these problems."'
6
Significantly, although his district is racially diverse, Watt has usually received the
majority support of both black and white voters, 17 a fact attesting to the notion that
political alliances can occur when different racial or ethnic groups share economic and
educational obstacles.
Coalition-building under a system of proportional representation may become
amplified over time, particularly as voters develop "their own political identities."',
8
Specifically, Professor Guinier argues that individual voters should be able to
determine their own identities, as opposed to being grouped together in a particular
category. 19 In her book, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in
Representative Democracy, Professor Guinier states, "no one needs to decide whether
a minority group identity is the only or primary identity." 20  Echoing Professor
Guinier's reasoning, Steven J. Mulroy, an Assistant United States Attorney General in
the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, notes that when a voter ranks
candidates, that voter may be more inclined to support a candidate from another party,
race, gender, ethnicity without sacrificing support for the voter's "insider" candidates,
who are often from that voter's class, race, gender, etc.
21
Advocates of alliance building often refer to its long-term implications for
cross-group interest alignment as the "anti-balkanization" effect, where cross-racial
coalitions, among other collations, could both emerge and strengthen over time.
Steven Hill and Rob Richie of the Center for Voting and Democracy argue that cross-
racial electoral coalitions "among people of color and white progressives could unite
across a state in electing a common slate of candidates rather than isolate voters in
separate one-seat districts., 22 To illustrate this point, an African-American voter could
rank an African-American candidate first, but then rank second a non-African-
American candidate who holds similar views.
Mulroy argues that "this voting pattern increases the incentive for candidates
- even candidates associated with a particular race, party, ideological persuasion, or
other cohesive voting bloc - to reach out to members of other constituencies for
'crossover' votes. 23 In practice, as noted by Barry Yeoman of the Nation, politicians,
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under a system of proportional representation, would be well served by reaching out,
because, "voters with common economic concerns - but who live far apart - can
band with one another to back a candidate who addresses their needs." 24 In contrast,
unless a state has only one congressional representative, the current single member
districts preclude state wide or larger regional coalitions.
Coalition building can also have important effects on public policy, particularly
when one considers how politics can often be a "plus sum" rather than a "zero sum"
game. That is, agreement finding between groups can lead to a greater net political
result for each group involved in a policy compromise, rather than group isolation or
distrust. This phenomenon is particularly integral to the advancement of minority
groups' interests, as many minority groups share common pursuits that, if unaligned
with other minority groups, are often frustrated by the dynamics of a majoritarian
democracy.
For instance, if we assume that the commonwealth of Massachusetts employed
a statewide (one district) proportional representation system for its election of ten
congressional representatives, and that 12% of the voters are Chinese-Americans, and
that there are two candidates of Chinese-American decent, coalition building could be
an important tool for greater representation amongst the Chinese-American
community. In this setting, if the two Chinese-American candidates appealed solely or
even mostly to the interests of the Chinese-American community, only one of the
candidates would likely gain victory. If one or both of those candidates found issues
that are embraced by multiple communities, however, it is far more likely that both
candidates would gain victory because they would attract support in addition to their
12% base. For example, if those candidates advocated financial assistance to recent
immigrants to the United States, they not only would appeal to many within their own
community, but also other communities in Massachusetts that would likely find such a
policy appealing - such as voters of Puerto Rican decent residing in Lawrence or Fall
River or those of Cambodian decent living in Lowell or Chelmsford. 25 Notably, such
coalition building would only be possible with proportional representation, since a
winner-take-all system would place geography and district lines in the way of
commonality-searching amongst otherwise disparate groups.
Coalition building could also benefit the many moderate voters who, under the
winner-take-all system, are left without representation of their choosing. For instance,
pro-choice or pro-affirmative action Republicans, like pro-life or tax-cutting
Democrats, are often discouraged from seeking office because their platforms are
incongruous with their parties' base (thus making victory in their respective parties'
primaries exceedingly difficult). Moreover, to run and win as an independent is
generally an implausible goal. Indeed, third party candidates who represent "the
middle" are often ignored because winning only 10% of the vote makes them




who have no chance of winning. As a result, many potential supporters of moderate
candidates are spurned by the prospect of wasting their votes on sure losers, a
phenomenon described as, "the vicious cycle of third party marginalization. 2
7
To illustrate how moderate voters are often un-represented in the current
political climate, and how proportional representation may prove beneficial, the
Georgia congressional delegation currently consists of eight conservative white
Republicans and three liberal black Democrats, a composition not particularly
reflective of "middle America.,, 28  Alternatively, under a system of proportional
representation, a more evenly spaced ideological distribution in the composition of
electors may improve voter efficacy, as more interests would be served with candidates
reaching out to voters of different characteristics across the state (or the multi-seat29
district). In that respect, coalition building would serve the interests of moderate
voters of all racial and ethnic groups.
A final benefit of coalition building relates to the increasing diversity of
American cities, particularly as cross-racial alliances seem beneficial in improving
integration and engendering unity. For instance, the 2000 Census reveals that for the
first time in Boston's history, whites constitute a minority with 49.5% of the
population - a 9.5% decline from the 1990 census, with African-American residents at
23.8% (a 1.2% increase), Latinos at 14.4% (a 49.1% increase) and Asians with 7.5% (a
67.5% increase). 30  Because of this increasing diversity, it is plausible that these
distinct minority groups would be well served by finding positions of agreement. A
system of proportional representation would encourage such unification.
A second valuable public policy rationale for the implementation of
proportional representation concerns the political effects of minority-majority
districting. Essentially, critics of such districting, such as Guinier and Inman, argue
that minority-majority districts "pack" minority votes, thus ensuring a super-majority
of minority votes in one particular district (a related issue to the notion of "wasted
votes"), and causing the remaining districts to have white majorities. Indeed, Inman
argues that this districting plan "isolates the minority groups, leaving other districts
whiter . . . . The representative of a majority-minority district is unlikely to exert
significant influence within the legislature, so the white representatives from the
remaining districts will likely predominate." 31
There is statistical evidence to corroborate the political loss endured by
minority interests under minority-majority districting. According to Maurice T.
Cunningham, former Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, "political scientists differ on how many districts maximization may
have cost the Democrats, but a moderate consensus is that that seven to twelve seats
were lost to the Democrats in 1992 and 1994 due to racial redistricting." 32 Such a loss
is enormously significant in terms of leadership and influence in Congress.
Essentially, while more minorities were elected to Congress, "as the new minority
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officeholders found their way around the capital, senior members of the Congressional
Black Caucus lost three chairmanships and seventeen subcommittee chairmanships
when the Republicans took over."
Anecdotal evidence also supports the notion that not only was the loss of
minority power a real issue under minority-majority districting, it may have been a real
intention as well. A remarkable excerpt from Smith v. Beasley,33 illuminates this point,
explaining that strange bedfellows emerged to ensure that while minorities would gain
more seats under minority-majority districting, they would also, paradoxically, lose
influence over the legislative process:
It is obvious from the notes of telephone conversations, memoranda,
orrespondence, and testimony presented that the Black Caucus, the
South Carolina Republican Party, and the Department of Justice were
seeking to maximize black representation in the South Carolina House
of Representatives with little concern for compactness of districts,
contiguity, or communities of interest.
Alternatively, a system of proportional representation would preserve the
integrity of elections by making political motivations transparent. Indeed, the
reduction (if a state moved to larger multi-member districts) or elimination (if a state
moved to one state-wide district) of political machinations in the redistricting process
would better serve all voters, for the commonality of interests could be aligned in ways
that overcome previously polarized barriers between groups.
A third major policy justification for the use of proportional representation
involves the creation of authentic representation for minority groups.3" This
justification has been most often illustrated through its application to the African-
American community. Specifically, University of Maryland Professor Mark A. Graber
defines "authentic black representation" as follows: "when a significant number of
black voters support candidates committed to serving their perceived common interests
as African-Americans, that group will have the power to elect an 'authentic black
representative."' 35  Importantly, authentic representation is often viewed as a
substantially better form of representation than "surrogate" or "trusted" representation.
In other words, some argue that a representative from one's own group is more reliable
to advance the interests of that group than would be a representative from another
group.
Proportional representation would, in the opinion of both Professors Guinier
and Graber, advance the likelihood of authentic black representation. According to
Professor Guinier, proportional representation would prevent, "black officials [from]
defining their political agenda without reference to or consultation with a community
base.",3  Moreover, Professor Graber deduces that under a system of proportional
representation, "racial minorities could be confident that the officials they choose
actually would represent them in legislative debates."37
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To illustrate the importance of "authentic" representation, particularly as it
pertains to both the advancement of a legislative agenda and the necessity of
compromise within a legislative body, the German Green Party and the German system
of proportional representation provides a telling example. In 1994, the German Greens
won less than 10% of the national vote, and were unable to win a single district
election. 38 The Greens, however, because they had both a concentrated agenda and
actual seats in the Legislature, as opposed to surrogate sypathizers, were able to force
some of their most important environmental positions onto the national scene.
Subsequently, a number of those positions have become law, not because a majority of
the legislature would, in the absence of the Greens, vote for those positions, but rather
because once the Greens secured actual seats in the Legislature, other parties were
forced to acquiesce to greater environmental safeguards in order to secure passage of
their own agendas. Moreover, since that time, the German Greens have increased their
share of legislative seats by six times and have become the third largest political party
in the German parliament. If Germany had employed a "winner-take-all" system,
however, the Greens may never have earned a seat in the Legislature.39
Another example of authentic representation can be demonstrated through the
use of proportional representation in the early 20'h Century, where a number of
localities in the Midwest employed proportional representation. For instance, during
the city council elections in Ashtabula, Ohio, Irish Catholics were able to unite behind
an Irish Catholic candidate and elect the first ever Irish Catholic city councilman in
Ohio.40 Prior to the implementation, Irish Catholics were a residentially dispersed
minority and were unable to elect a ward member or an at-large representative. With
proportional representation and a multi-member district, however, the Irish Catholics
gained a voice for the first time and were able to better advance issues of particular
import to that community.
Like many Americans of Irish Catholic decent from a century ago, many
African-Americans today are economically disadvantaged, particularly in relation to
other ethnic and racial groups in the United States. As Professor Guinier notes,
however, African-Americans are also "a poor and historically oppressed group.' ' l
History shows that as Americans with Irish Catholic heritage gained access to
legislative positions, not only did the prospect of electing such Americans become less
foreign to voters, but the interests of the Irish Catholic community were served by
having actual community members represent them - those individuals who could share
in the struggles and the history of being both of Irish Catholic decent, and
simultaneously, being American. Moreover, they became a collective player in
politics,; and were able to use the greatest political asset - a vote in the legislative
process - as a tool for maximizing the interests of the Irish-American community.
The challenges of being simultaneously African-American and American in
achieving a political office are likely far greater than those experienced by any other
199
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American minority group. Consequently, it seems tremendously important that
authentic African-American candidates are available to the African-American
community. On the other hand, the current winner-take-all system, according to
Professor Guinier, is far more likely to produce "establishment-endorsed blacks" or
"marginal community members whose only real connection with the black community
is skin color. ',42 Professor Guinier sharply criticizes how, "electoral support by a
majority of black voters is thus a convenient proxy for political authenticity."43 As a
result, these representatives are "not elected as the representatives of choice in the
black community, but instead preferred by the larger society.""
Congressman Watt shed light on the issue of establishment-endorsed
candidates. After the Supreme Court held his minority-majority congressional district
invalid in Shaw v. Hunt,45 Congressman Watt feared that he could lose his black
authenticity if forced to seek office in a more heterogeneous district, and thus have to
embrace positions incongruous with his and the African-American community's
beliefs:
The thing I loved about the old 12th District is that I could be their
representative and never feel like I was bending to their wishes. .. If
elected to a more heterogeneous district] I'm not going to be Mel Watt
the progressive. I'm going to be Mel Watt the representative. Does that
mean I'll have to bend my positions? I don't know. Does that mean I'll
be uncomfortable representing my new district? I don't know. If it
becomes too uncomfortable, then it becomes incumbent on me to
admit that, and go on to something else.46
Indeed, other scholars endorse Professor Guinier's argument that more
authentic minority office holding will produce a more egalitarian legislative process.
According to Douglas Amy, a professor of Government at Mount Holyoke College,
"increased representation means minority communities can better promote their
political and economic interests and focus more attention on what they see as
pressing. '47  In an illuminating illustration of this idea, Professor Amy rhetorically
asks, "imagine . . . if twelve black United States senators, rather than none, were
pushing legislation on civil rights, affirmative action, urban renewal, and social welfare
spending. Would this not make a significant difference?' 48 Such a question reiterates
Professor Guinier's belief that, "the issue here is one of procedure and process, not
substantive justice." 49
Like Professors Guinier and Amy, Professor Nan D. Hunter of Brooklyn Law
School endorses proportional representation as a way to "encourage the growth of
intracommunity diversity of interests and viewpoints," particularly when, in a
majoritarian democracy, minority voters will always be in a perpetual disadvantage in
securing passage of legislation.5° Similar to Professor Graber, Professor Hunter argues
that minority representatives should not depend on the support of other
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representatives. 51  Specifically, Professor Hunter argues that proportional
representation permits African American voters to cluster votes so as to, "maximize the
likelihood of influencing policy even where ... a minority [representative]... cannot
attract coalition support from members of the majority., 52
Authentic African-American and other minority interests have been served in
the past through proportional voting. As illustrated by Mulroy, when New York City
employed its first preference vote election for its community school boards in 1970,
"the percentage of black and Hispanic community school board members jumped to
close to the corresponding black and Hispanic percentages of the citywide
population." 5  Similarly, the percentages of black and Hispanic representatives
increased commensurate with subsequent population increases. 54
The goals of authenticity should not interfere with alliance-building, because a
group can acquire more votes in the legislative process by promoting candidates who
serve both the interests of that group and of other groups. That is, agreement finding
between groups should not be ignored because of concerns for authenticity. In
contrast, Professor Guinier asserts, "even a mildly sympathetic white official will not
dependably consider black interests if that individual must also accommodate the more
dominant views of the white constituents." 55 Unfortunately, distrust of other groups
only heightens the barriers between groups and harms commonality finding. While
authenticity is an important benefit of proportional representation, particularly as
minority constituencies could better hold accountable their elected officials by better
defining group concerns, such a benefit may, on balance, prove detrimental if it
discourages candidates from reaching out to other groups.
A fourth reason highlighting proportional representation's likely benefit to our
democracy relates to voter turnout in congressional elections. Simply put, most races
in a winner-take-all system are already decided long before even the primaries take
place. In fact, a study by the Center for Voting and Democracy concluded that,
"congressional incumbents nationally are re-elected more than 98% of the time . ..
government does not tolerate business monopolies." 56 "[Yet] when districts are drawn
to insulate legislators from competition, voters are robbed of having a choice., 57
Moreover, as noted earlier, many voters are not satisfied with either party, yet
simultaneously do not want to waste their votes on unelectable non-mainstream
candidates. Collectively, these voting disincentives explain why voter turnout in the
United States is comparatively low in relation to other democracies.
Conversely, proportional representation encourages voter turnout. As argued
by Mulroy, because elections using proportional representation "mathematically tend
to lead to results that more accurately reflect the entire electorate's preferences," these
elections encourage more issue-specific candidates to seek office, as third parties have
realistic chances for success under proportional representation. 58 As a result, added
competition and expanded choice lead to higher participation rates.59
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To illustrate this point, John Moot, a resident of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
explains how his vote seems more significant because of Cambridge's proportional
voting system, particularly when compared to his experience as a Republican voter in a
historically Democratic congressional district:
Since becoming a resident of Cambridge in the 1950's, I have been
fortunate to have always had a representative of my choice on the City
Council, thanks to proportional representation. In contrast, I have
never had a representative of my choice in the U.S. House of
Representatives because I am a Republican in what was Tip O'Neill's
and is now Joe Kennedy's district.
6
Indeed, Mr. Moot's anecdotal evidence seems to reinforce the idea that with
proportional representation, voters appreciate the reduced chance of being "shutout" at
the polls. Importantly, this appreciation translates into higher voting percentages.
Voters' perceptions of elections may also impact turnout, particularly when
winner-take-all and proportional representation are compared. For instance, in winner-
take-all elections, a 10% lead by one candidate in the polls immediately preceding an
election often translates into a likely "blowout" for the leading candidate.
Consequently, many supporters, on either side, may be unconvinced their votes will
actually affect the outcome. Therefore, these voters will view waiting in line to vote as
an opportunity cost, and thus not vote. Conversely, in a proportional representation
system, a 10% deficit to the leading candidate is by no means fatal. In fact, with multi-
seat or statewide elections, usually more than two positions will be available, and
voters can be assured that their votes will be transferred instead of wasted.6'
Not only are voters more encouraged to vote under proportional representation,
thus increasing voter turnout, but political parties, particularly those consisting of
minority or issue-specific groups, have heightened incentives to increase "get-out-the-
vote efforts" - a phenomenon itself likely raising voter turnout.62 Moreover, numerous
scholars have attested to the fact that greater voter turnout has the additional qualitative
effect of improving political culture. "Without exception, countries using proportional
representation enjoy a higher level of voter turnout and more vibrant political
discourse." 6
3
Some data supports these notions. First, voting studies that control for other
voting influences find that proportional representation has increased voter turnout in
European elections from 9% to 12%. 64 Second, based on election results collected
from proportional representation elections held in Ohio in the twentieth century, most
voters could expect to have a candidate elected that they had supported.65 On the other
hand, the change in Ohio's electoral systems did not have an independent effect on
turnout. Indeed, "turnout rose and fell with local issues and candidates[;] . . . in




Although the data on proportional representation's independent effect on voter-
turnout is mixed, it is clear that many voters, including minority voters, are "turned
off" by winner-take-all systems. In contrast, with proportional representation, voters
of all groups can be assured their votes will not be "wasted," and, consequently, get-
out-the-vote campaigns will likely have a greater impact on voter turnout. Indeed, get-
out-the-vote campaigns appear to be particularly effective in encouraging voting by
minority groups, especially in those states with close elections - that is, states where
voting really matters. To illustrate this point, David A. Bositis, a senior research
associate at the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, concluded that the
NAACP's 2000 drive to increase the African-American vote in Florida not only
brought many first-time voters to the polls, but helped increased by 65% the number of
African-American Florida residents voting in the 2000 election compared to four years
earlier.67  Similarly, the $12 million NAACP effort to increase African-American
voting nation-wide increased the turnout from the African-American community by
one million votes from 1996, with early estimates of up to 50% of voting-age African-
Americans casting ballots in 2000.68
Significantly, the states featuring the greatest four year increases in African-
American voting were those with hotly contested elections, most notably in Missouri,
where 140% more African-Americans voted in 2000 to choose between John Ashcroft
and Mel Carnahan than had cast ballots in 1996.69 As a result, it is likely that with a
system of proportional representation, where voters can be certain that their votes will
not be wasted, similar increases in voting will occur. Certainly, bringing more
minorities into the political process can only enhance our democracy, as all people
should have a right - and a reason - to participate in the American experience.
A fifth and final rationale for the use of proportional representation in
congressional elections relates to the present Supreme Court's drive against majority-
minority districts - and, as critics note, integrated legislatures. Numerous civil rights
leaders, such as Professor Guinier and Reverend Jesse Jackson, have noted that more
than seventy-five localities have adopted proportional representation to settle voting
rights cases. 70 Indeed, Professor Kathleen Barber notes, "as the U.S. Supreme Court
draws the noose ever more tightly around districts drawn to expand minority
representation, the alternative of proportional representation becomes ever more
compelling."
71
More importantly, particularly with the elimination of minority-majority
districting, proportional representation offers a substitute for minority ascension to
political office. Indeed, scholars such as Professor Graber maintain that, "proportional
representation would increase the number of black legislators without any recourse to
the contentious racial gerrymanders that the Supreme Court recently declared
unconstitutional. 72  Likewise, Professor Amy explains that contentious race and
election issues would become moot under a system of proportional representation: "the
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controversial issues of reverse discrimination and reserving seats by race become
irrelevant under proportional representation... [because] it allows for the election of
minority candidates, if they have voter support., 73  As a latent consequence, the
elimination of politically designed districts would also reduce incumbency protection,
for many recognize that, "the process of gerrymandering districts is typically a means
to another end - incumbency protection. [In contrast] proportional representation
eliminates the need for drawing legislative districts.' In the following section, we
will address the issue of incumbency protection and how it pertains to proportional
representation.
IV. THE DRAWBACKS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:
TAILORING A NEW VOTING SYSTEM TO ADDRESS
LEGITIMATE CONCERNS
Opponents of proportional representation offer several arguments countering
the benefits of proportional representation. First, because independent and issue-
specific parties are encouraged under proportional representation, such an electoral
system may help elect authentic racist, sexist, or other extremist groups. Indeed,
Professor Graber, by incorporating Professor Guinier's language, maintains that,
"cumulative voting schemes permit the same number of whites, Klu Klux Klan
members, plumbers, and Brooklyn Dodger fans to elect the 'authentic' representatives
of their choice." As a result, the range of all who feel unrepresented in "winner-take-
all" systems will be better able to elect more "authentic" representatives, including
those who simply hate other kinds of people. If elected, these hateful people could be
both disruptive and isolated, thus potentially stymieing the legislative process.
The history of proportional representation - when unrestricted - has
validated this complaint. For instance, the prominence of religious extremist parties in
Israel has been associated with Israel's use of proportional representation.75 Germany
has experienced a recent rise in Neo-Nazi activity, some of which has been attributed
to the belief that such groups are motivated by the realistic prospect of gaining elected
office under Germany's system of proportional representation.
Some opponents offer recent public opinion polls to suggest that "proportional
representation is more likely to augment the overall political strength of extreme racists
than of persons committed to racial justice" if implemented in the United States.76
Some polls confirm that "politically inefficacious white reactionaries" may be more
numerous than "politically inefficacious progressive persons of color., 77
On the other hand, steps can be made to limit the opportunity of fringe parties
and candidates to gain office. Most notably, some nations have employed the "5%
bar." With this modification, a candidate is unable to gain office unless she has
garnered at least 5% of the total vote. Germany employs this hurdle and has thus far
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been able to legislate without the presence of Neo-Nazi party members. 8 Similarly, if
such a bar were instituted in the United States, extremist candidates would be hindered,
if not altogether excluded.
A second complaint offered by opponents of proportional representation entails
the alleged "balkanization" of voting patterns, a phenomenon referring to racial bloc
voting and the fragmentation of the legislative process into competing racial and ethnic
factions. According to proponents of this position, minority voters would tend to favor
candidates who extremely favor the interests of that minority group, thus electing those
who would be inclined to fully disassociate themselves from other congressional
members.
There are several flaws to this argument. First, there is no empirical evidence
from other systems using proportional representation that racially polarized voting
increases upon adoption of proportional representation.79  Indeed, in our last
Presidential election - the greatest "winner-take-all" election imaginable - 92% of
African-American voters did not vote for the eventual winner, George W. Bush, thus
making one wonder whether a vote could be any more polarized under a system of
proportional representation. 0
Second, history demonstrates the converse of this argument to be most
accurate. That is, proportional voting actually improves relations between groups,
because more groups will have a "seat at the table," thus making their interests more
real and understandable to other parties. To illustrate this point, a former Cambridge,
Massachusetts school committee member reflects that while much of Boston suffered
from race-riots following a decision to desegregate busing, Cambridge managed to
escape such upheaval: "[P]roportional representation is the reason Cambridge didn't
burn during the years of demonstrations, the reason desegregation of the schools was
achieved without any significant disruption."8'
Quantitative data reinforces this point. According to a study of proportional
representation races in Ohio in the early twentieth century, "there were no significant
differences in the percentage of divided votes on council issues [prior to proportional
representation]. 8 2  In fact, this study reveals that, "factionalism, based on non-
unanimous votes on substantive issues, actually declined in Hamilton and Toledo. In
Cleveland and Cincinnati, there were no significant differences."83
Some even speculate that because relations between groups are more likely to
improve under proportional representation, racial bloc voting might actually decrease
in time. According to Mulroy, "to allow minority candidates to be elected and to show
white voters that they can function effectively[,] ... [proportional representation]
might have the long-term effect of reducing racial bloc voting."' 4 In fact, the history of
proportional representation may corroborate Mulroy's inclination, as "evidence in
some communities suggests alternative systems encourage not only the formation of
cross-racial coalitions but also representatives of different racial and ethnic groups to
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work together. That was the experience in Cincinnati and New York City during their
use of preference voting earlier this century." 85
A third charge leveled by opponents of proportional representation relates to
their belief that, under a system of proportional representation, representatives who are
white or non-black minorities would be motivated to more regularly oppose programs
and policies that benefit the African-American community. These proponents contend
that because ties between constituents and representatives are tightened under
proportional representation, white and other non-black conservatives would more
likely oppose liberal racial policies than in a system of winner-take-all, because with
proportional representation, as noted by Professor Guinier with her authenticity
argument, representatives must be especially responsive to the needs of their
constituency. 6  Simply put, representatives elected in a system of proportional
representation have less independence from their constituencies.
Similarly, others argue that because non-black minorities, like Asian-
Americans, would gain representation under a system of proportional representation,
studies which suggest that these groups are more inclined than whites to hold negative
views of blacks may prove troublesome to the African-American community. For
instance, Professor Graber finds that, "changes in electoral systems that increase the
power of Asian-Americans in California, for example, are not likely to result in more
affirmative action policies at state colleges and universities."87 Moreover, Michael
Lind, in a New Leader editorial, notes that non-black minorities may benefit
substantially from the diminishment or even elimination of certain affirmative action
programs, particularly those used for college admissions:
In 1997, the last year affirmative action was practiced at the University
of California's Berkeley campus, 1,266 Latinos, 562 blacks, 2,911
whites and 2,925 Asians were accepted; in 1999, 741 Latinos, 276
blacks, 3,018 whites and 3,196 Asians were accepted. As the statistics
demonstrate, a significant number of Asian-American and white
applicants had previously lost their places to less qualified Latinos and
African Americans.
' ' 8
Consequently, critics maintain that with more non-black minorities as representatives,
African-Americans may find themselves worse off policy-wise under a system of
proportional representation than under our current winner-take-all system.
Other evidence, however, points in a different direction. For instance, while
Lind can offer numbers suggesting that non-black minorities should not support
affirmative action for college admissions, other numbers show that they are far more
supportive than Lind suspects. Specifically, as noted by the Washington Post, 61% of
California's Asian-American voters voted against the state's "Proposition 209," an act
which bars the consideration of race or sex in hiring, government contracting, and
admissions to public colleges and universities.89 Though the Proposition passed, and
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though evidence suggests that Asian-Americans have benefited from its enactment, the
fact that most Asian-Americans opposed the Proposition suggests that more Asian-
American representatives would benefit African-Americans, not harm them, as argued
by Lind and, to a certain extent, Graber.
A fourth argument offered by critics of proportional representation states that
such a system ignores the importance of geography, which, according to these critics,
serves as a useful proxy for community interests on the part of voters. As a result, with
the elimination of single-member districts, representatives will have less incentive to
cater to the local desires and interests of current congressional districts. To illustrate
this point, former Boston Mayor Raymond Flynn conveyed great resistance to the
prospect that Boston could be redistricted so as not to have a geographic-exclusive
seat. In the process, Mayor Flynn exhibited the emotional and historical attachment
some have towards their congressional districts: "Can you imagine a big American city
like Boston without a resident in Congress? I think people are going to wake up and
say that can't happen, not in the home of Joe Moakley, John McCormack and TipO'Neill.'9°
Indeed, the Congressional Research Service concludes that many districts
"come about as the result of line-drawers consciously trying to accommodate
geographic features, such as rivers, or by following . . . jurisdiction lines, such as
cities." 1 Equally important, as argued by Professor Jerome Raskin, the Supreme Court
has demonstrated an affinity for geographically-conscious districts, even when such
districts are designed more to protect incumbency than to advance geographic interests.
For instance, in Abrams v. Johnson,92 "the Court found it permissible to redistrict with
the intent of protecting 'incumbents from contests with each other.' 93 Similarly, in
Burns v. Richardson,9 the Court found that tailoring the geographic dimensions of
districts with the effect of protecting incumbents does not violate Equal Protection.95
Several counter-arguments have been offered in response to the geographic-
centric approach. First, most eligible voters in a district are not represented by
someone they voted for in a winner-take-all system. To illustrate this point, in the
1996 Congressional elections, with only 44% of eligible voters voting, only 28% of
eligible voters cast ballots for those ultimately elected to Congress. 96
Second, most districts are drawn primarily to protect incumbents, not to
advance geographic interests. That is, since 98% of Congresspersons are re-elected,
and over 33% of state house races are unopposed, proportional representation
advocates like Mulroy argue that feography appears to be a greater proxy for political
self-interest than anything else.9  On the other hand, such a reality has not, as
demonstrated by the Court's holdings in Abrams and Burns, upset the highest court in
the land.
Finally, proponents of proportional representation state that it would not
preclude geographic groupings. Rather, it would allow citizens themselves to
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determine how and whether they should be grouped in electing representatives.
Indeed, as illustrated by Barry Yeoman, "those who identify with a particular area can
join with others who feel the same way and elect a candidate who is promoting issues
of issues of concern to that locality." 98 Or, as argued by Congresswoman Cynthia
McKinney, "districts are a construct of politics, not geography[;] . . . redistricting
allows legislators to choose their constituents before their constituents choose them."99
In fact, some even suggest that in this "information-technology age," physical location
has become increasingly less important in one's life, and as a result, geographic
groupings seem increasingly less meaningful. 00  Lastly, the prospect of coalition
building would be enhanced by the removal of incumbency-generated geographical
barriers, for candidates could more readily seek out alliances with other groups.
V. THE LEGAL VIABILITY OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
Contingent upon legislation, a system of proportional representation can be
employed in congressional elections. There are a number of reasons corroborating this
point. First, and most importantly, the United States Constitution does not explicitly
ban the use of proportional representation, instead inviting Congress to use whatever
election system it deems appropriate.' 0' Such authority for Congress to take action
would likely emanate from Article I of the Constitution: "The Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections, for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each state by the Legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.' °2 It is clear
from this language that the Constitution allows states, contingent upon congressional
approval, to have discretion in selecting their election system(s).
Indeed, advocates of proportional representation are quick to assert that
proportional representation could be adopted for all U.S. legislative elections without a
constitutional amendment. That is, only a legislative act or passage of an initiative
would be required. 03 Other scholars, however, maintain that Congress has already
spoken on proportional representation and explicitly banned multi-member districts for
U.S. House elections in 1967, though such critics concede that this legislation could be
reversed.'04 In particular, Public Law 90-196 requires that, "no district is to elect more
than one Representative . . . ." As a matter of fact, the Congressional Research
Service notes that "the United States has implicitly rejected the concept of proportional
representation by party for Congress by adopting the single-member district
standard." 05 Whether Congress has spoken or not, since proportional representation is
predicated on the use of multi-member districts, congressional action would be
required for U.S. House elections to incorporate proportional representation.
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Some in Congress would like to reverse the 1967 legislation. In the past 4
years, Congresswoman McKinney has sponsored both the Voter's Choice Act and the
State's Choice of Voting Systems Act, two legislative acts that would restore the pre-
1967 opportunity for states to use proportional systems to elect their delegations to the
House. 6 Although both the United States Term Limits Organization and the National
Women's Political Caucus supported Congresswoman McKinney, neither bill received
much attention, and even less support. From a politick perspective, Congresswoman
McKinney was essentially requesting "politicians to adopt a system that will cost them
the near-guarantee of a lifetime seat."'' 7 In terms of its potential effect on incumbency,
Congresswoman McKinney's bill was like a super McCain-Feingold bill - thus not an
attractive option for many incumbents on either side of the aisle.
While Congresswoman McKinney was unable to persuade her colleagues,
Congressman Watts is presently attempting to do so. In House Resolution 1173,
Congressman Watts has reintroduced Congresswoman McKinney's State's Choice of
Voting Systems Act.'° 8 Interestingly, support for Congressman Watt's proposal extends
to members of both the Democratic and Republican parties, as former Congressman
Tom Campbell (R-Ca), an opponent of affirmative action, supports the legislation. 10 9
As a matter of fact, statistical data suggests that proportional representation may help
Republican candidates as much as it helps minority candidates, thus defusing an
contention that proportional representation is part of a particular ideological agenda.
Other conservative advocates, such as Lind, explain their support for proportional
representation by recognizing that, "whites where Latinos are the majority [would be]
empowered.""' Moreover, Lind believes that with a system of proportional
representation, liberal activists could no longer blame the winner-take-all system for
the comparatively low number of minority representatives." 2
Skeptics, however, have already concluded that unless the NAACP is willing to
spend resources on advancing the bill, passage seems unlikely. In the past, the
NAACP did not undertake such an effort. For example, Jacqueline Berrien, an
NAACP official, remarked on the infeasibility of choosing to spend money on election
reform when that same money could be used to address current redistricting and voter
turnout: "The practical reality is that unless the McKinney bill passes, the elections
must be held from single-member districts. As long as that is true, our advocacy
centers on the redistricting process."" 3 As a result, "mainline civil rights organizations
are reluctant to devote much political capital to the uphill effort." '" 4
A second legal consideration reflects upon the available case law on
proportional representation. Generally, case law supports proportional representation
as a viable method of electing candidates. For example, in Holder v. Hall, Justice
Clarence Thomas opines, "[N]othing in our present understanding of the Voting Rights
Act places a principled limit on the authority of federal courts that would prevent them
from . . securing proportional representation based on transferable votes."'"15
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Moreover, in Reynolds v. Sims,' 1 6 Chief Justice Earl Warren held that individuals have
a right to fair and effective representation - language that may suggest, as Professor
Virginia Hench notes, that a system such as proportional representation, which
encourages the fairest of voting results, would be valid. 117
On the other hand, the current Court has several members who likely oppose
the use of proportional representation. In fact, according to Professor Hench, "the
greatest difficulty with [proportional representation] . . . is that the current Court's
willful color-blindness is unlikely to permit it to be implemented.",118
In particular, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a former state legislator, is likely
to serve as proportional representation's most ardent opponent. As Professor Judith
Reed points out, "Justice O'Connor has an expressed fidelity to the two-party
system." 9 To illustrate this argument, Professor Reed finds that, "In Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366 (1997), Justice O'Connor joined the
majority opinion upholding a prohibition on multiparty candidacies."' 120 Specifically,
Justice O'Connor has expressed an avowed belief in "the strong interest in the stability
of [their] political systems." 121 To illuminate this point, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
F.C.C., Justice O'Connor referred to proportional representation as a form of "outright
racial balancing."'122 In practice, while Justice O'Connor has not supported the
capacity of states to ban third parties to ensure such stability, she has unequivocally
stated that states preserve the right to "enact reasonable election regulations that may,
in practice, favor the traditional two-par system[;] . . . political stability is best served
through a healthy two-party system."' 12  Consequently, notes Professor Reed, "for
Justice O'Connor, whether independent voters are discriminated against, or other
voters are deprived of the option of voting for a third party candidate or at least the
opportunity . . . is less important than honoring the ultimate legislative goal of
maintaining a two-party system.
' 124
The 4th Circuit has also weighed in on proportional representation, and, like
Justice O'Connor, it appears to find its possible implementation in violation of section
two of the Voting Rights Act. In McGhee v. Granville County,125 the court found that
when section two states that "nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population," it "means that statutorily protected are not entitled to 'proportional
representation. " 126 Further analysis suggests that the court's ruling would not prevent
the use of proportional representation in congressional elections. In particular, Mulroy
argues that "the language only refers to the idea that a consistent failure of black
candidates to win 40% of the jurisdiction's population would not, by itself, constitute a
Section 2 violation."' 127 In a sense, therefore, the court, as interpreted by Mulroy, only
opposes a guarantee to proportional representation.
A third line of evidence for the legality of proportional representation relates to
the fact that local elections have employed proportional representation with results that
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have helped racial minorities gain access to the legislative process. As Professor
Barber notes, proportional representation was particularly appealing during the
"Progressive Era" as a form of a fairer system of elections.12  For instance, localities
in Illinois, Alabama, New Mexico, South Dakota, Colorado, New York, Ohio, and
Massachusetts have all at one time utilized proportional representation. 129 In addition,
twenty-two cities have employed this system.' 30  The results of such use were
admirable, particularly in terms of expanding minority opportunity to elected office, as
"the single-transferable vote enabled African-Americans to get elected decades before
that became commonplace."'
3 1
There have been other important local examples. For instance, New York City
held five City Council elections from 1937 to 1945 that employed proportional
representation. 132 Importantly, "those elections helped break the stranglehold of the
city's political machines and elected Adam Clayton Powell as the Council's first
African-American member."'
133
Despite its apparent achievements, proportional representation presently exists
only in Cambridge, Massachusetts.' 34  Other communities eliminated proportional
representation for either of two reasons. First, during the late 1940s, a small number of
Communists won city council elections in cities that employed proportional
representation, thus leading several of those cities to repeal proportional
representation. 135 A second related point, as Steven Hill and Rob Richie point out, is
that "old style politics" never really fades away, and many in that category were
opportunistic in targeting candidates who did not tow the party line: "[F]ormerly
dominant political forces outlasted reformers and were successful in repealing
proportional representation everywhere. Their general tactic was targeting unpopular
minorities like blacks and leftists."' 36 As noted by Professor Barber, minorities were
most affected by proportional representation's repeal: "After proportional
representation was repealed, minorities lost their foothold in public office in the
winner-take-all plurality at-large elections that supplanted proportional
representation."' 137 Moreover, it is important to note that the legality of proportional
representation in local elections does not necessarily translate into legality in federal
elections, as such elections are covered by federal law.
A final legal justification for the use of proportional representation rests in the
fact that most democracies use some form of proportional representation. In fact, of
the world's thirty-six most economically prosperous democracies, thirty-three employ
some form of proportional representation for their national elections.13  For instance,
Germany, Norway, New Zealand and South Africa all use proportional
representation. 39  Interestingly, South Africa, upon holding its first multi-racial
elections in April 1994, abandoned its single-member districts in favor of proportional
representation, thus signifying a new era as a real multi-racial democracy. 140 Most
recently, Japan has approved a proportional representation system to "clean up
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corruption-plagued politics.' 14 1  As with the use of proportional elections in local
elections, however, the use of proportional representation in other democracies does
not necessarily suggest that proportional representation would be valid for use in this
democracy's federal elections. On the other hand, a legal argument for proportional
representation in the American democracy should be generally strengthened by the fact
that almost all other liberal democracies employ this system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Proportional representation is an intriguing and largely appealing alternative to
our present winner-take-all voting system. In particular, proportional representation
would provide greater opportunities for minority groups to gain access to legislative
positions and would offer greater incentives for all groups to vote. Moreover,
proportional representation, in conjunction with statewide or larger multi-seat districts,
would diminish or eliminate the highly politicized re-districting process.
While critics of proportional representation highlight its potential for
encouraging the growth of hate groups, other nations featuring proportional
representation have avoided such unintended aid by employing a minimum vote
percentage requirement. Similarly, concerns that proportional representation would
"balkanize" the legislative process into entrenched factions are not only
uncorroborated, but the history of proportional representation demonstrates that
varying groups are more likely to understand and appreciate each others' concerns
when all those groups are represented in the legislative process. Likewise, criticism
that African-Americans would be harmed by the election of more individuals from
other minority groups proves contradicted both by those groups' voting trends on
Affirmative-Action measures and by the likely heightened appreciation that those
groups would have for one another upon their common presence in the legislative
body. Finally, while some political commentators express concern that proportional
representation would dismantle historical geographic boundaries, those same
commentators fail to recognize that many geographic boundaries are designed solely to
protect incumbency, not to preserve community ties. Besides, should states remain
committed to their geographic boundaries, they could, under a system of proportional
representation, implement several larger multi-seat districts rather than one statewide
multi-seat district.
Provided it garnered political support, adoption of proportional representation
would likely require only legislative enactment by Congress that could either mandate
the use of proportional elections in congressional elections, or, more likely, allow
states to choose between proportional representation or winner-take-all systems.
Importantly, though the present Supreme Court may be unwelcoming to proportional
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representation, the United States Constitution specifically empowers Congress to
determine its system of elections. Moreover, proportional representation has already
been used in local elections and is currently being used by as many as 90% of the
world's liberal democracies.
Above all, however, proportional representation would encourage collaboration
between otherwise disparate groups. Indeed, such collaboration may not only unite
groups for political causes, thus increasing their opportunities for mutually beneficial
reforms, but it would likely lead to greater social and cultural understandings between
those groups. As a result, racism and cultural discrimination are likely to diminish
over time following adoption of proportional representation. And should that occur,
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